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THOUGHTS ON HAYDEN C. COVINGTON AND THE PAUCITY
OF LITIGATION SCHOLARSHIP
Ronald K.L. Collins*
Start here: Hayden Cooper Covington (1911–1978). His name defined him.
Heathen. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word refers
to someone who holds, “religious beliefs of a sort that are considered
unenlightened, . . . not of the Christian, Jewish, or Muslim faiths.” By that
measure, he fit the definitional bill. His first name, Hayden, circled back in
etymological time to the German Heiden, meaning “heathen.” On the one
hand, it is strange that a man who devoted his life to defending religious
liberty should be tagged a “heathen.” On the other hand, it is entirely
understandable given the religious beliefs he defended—those of a nonTrinitarian sect that negated the immortality of the soul and denied the
existence of Hell. In short, those whose faith he defended were often seen as
heathens, enemies of True Faith. That his faith encouraged conscientious
objection to military service in wartime and likewise urged its followers to
refuse to salute the American flag only increased the animus (local and
worldwide) directed at such “unpatriotic” “heathens.” And then there is this:
to be named a “Jehovah’s Witnesses” has long been viewed (and continues
to be in many parts of the world) as a badge of madness of the kind that
invites censure, censorship, condemnation and incarceration.1
In sum, Hayden Covington, the “heathen” from birth who headed the
Watchtower Society’s legal team, made it his life calling to defend the rights
of his fellow “heathens.” Yet in time, he was forced to take his leave from
his beloved Witnesses, though he was accepted back into the group’s fold
just prior to his death in 1978.
*
Co-director, History Book Festival. Former Harold S. Shefelman Scholar, University of Washington
School of Law. This Article (© 2019 Ronald Collins) benefited greatly from comments made at workshops
at New York Law School and CUNY Law School and also from comments offered during my presentation
at the annual conference of the First Amendment Lawyers Association. Thanks go out as well to Professors
Larry Tribe, David Vladeck, and Kathryn Watts for their most helpful suggestions and to Cheryl Nyberg
of the University of Washington Gallagher Law Library for her invaluable research assistance.
Additionally, I have benefitted from the thoughtful and timely works (cited below) of Professor Richard
Lazarus, whose scholarship in the area of Supreme Court litigation is a model for others to follow.
1 In Germany, Witnesses were placed in concentration camps and were in the words of the British
Ambassador to Germany, ‘almost as badly treated as the Jews.’ In Britain 1593 Witnesses were
convicted for refusing conscription and many, including 334 women, were imprisoned. In the United
States prosecution and incarceration of some 4000 Witnesses under selective service laws followed
its entry into the war.

William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah’s Witnesses in
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997, 1015 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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Think of it: what better exemplar of First Amendment freedom than this
maverick of a man, this “heathen” who defended “heathens” and did so at
time when the tide of public sentiment stood to destroy him. And yet, many
in the world of First Amendment law know little or nothing of the man and
his many contributions to our first freedom. Why?

The world of American free speech law is populated with many names,
from Benjamin Bache to Benjamin Gitlow, from James Madison to
Alexander Meiklejohn, and from Holmes and Brandeis to Kennedy and
Roberts. And then there is Floyd Abrams, the most noted First Amendment
lawyer of our time. But what of Hayden Covington, who argued more First
Amendment cases in the Supreme Court than all others? Who was he and
what is his legacy? And what does his obscurity say about today’s public law
scholarship?
To raise such questions is to point to the problem, the key one: So much
of legal scholarship is infatuated with appellate decisional law and those who
“write” it. (The quotation marks point to the fact that today few appellate
judges actually write their own opinions, leaving it instead to the handiwork
of young law clerks.) In other words, if lawyers like Hayden Covington are
virtually ignored in our scholarship and casebooks, it is first and foremost
because of the judge-made-law view that is so much the norm in modern
American legal thinking.
We live in court-centric times. That is, the law is equated with the workproduct of judges, and this with sustained frequency. Judicial review is the
altar at which many worship. By that measure, John Marshall is the High
Lord of all things deemed law. Ever since 1803 when he pronounced on the
rule and role of judicial review2 in our constitutional system of government,
the ever-evolving tendency has been to look to appellate judges to
comprehend everything from the workings of the Commerce and Taxing
Power Clauses, to the ambiguities of the Eleventh Amendment, to the
mysteries of the Equal Protection Clause, to the modern-day meanings of the
First Amendment. And the same is often the stock-in-trade of how private
law is taught and written about, ranging from remedial matters in the law of
contracts, to the level of liability in torts, to the meaning of a testamentary
document in wills. To discern the law and its meaning, we all too often look
first and finally to what judges do and say.
In light of this, too many teachers and scholars of the law remain
shamelessly silent about what lawyers do beforehand in writing statutes,
2

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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drafting regulations, crafting ordinances, preparing corporate bylaws,
negotiating deals, or in representing their clients at trial and on appeal. To be
sure, there are exceptions3 as in the case of clinical4 and transactional
approaches5 to teaching law along with what appears in a few specialty
journals.6 But the lion’s share of what is taught (at least in the first7 and
second8 years of law school) and what is written about in scholarly journals9
(particularly in constitutional law and criminal procedure) has to do with
judicial opinions, with the work-product of appellate judges. That is the
portrait of the law portrayed in much of the scholarship currently published
in American law journals.10
There was a time when the official U.S. Reports set out the lawyers’
arguments in considerable detail in order to set the scene for the opinions that
followed. That practice ended in 1941.11 Since then, the role of lawyers in
3 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CONTEMPORARY CIVIL LITIGATION (2009) (discussing
strategic, tactical, and practical choices inherent in civil litigation and using a variety of non-decisional
materials).
4 There are, for example, Supreme Court litigation clinics that exist in more and more law schools.
See Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2013) (insofar
as clinics have control over which cases they bring to the Court and can cause the Court to hear cases that
it might not otherwise have heard, the clinics’ work can implicate sometimes-latent tensions between
client-centered representation and cause-based advocacy).
5 See Ronald Collins & Edward Rubin, To Aid Business, Change Law School, N.Y. TIMES, March
5, 1995, at F9 (calling for changes to how law is taught and for need to move to more transactional
approaches to teaching commercial law).
6 There is also West’s informative and historically rich Law Stories Series. See Series, WEST
ACADEMIC, http://home.westacademic.com/series (click on “Law Stories Series” within the “Overviews”
section) (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). Even here, however, the work of the lawyers is too often presented in
abbreviated form (sans any serious analysis) as the story moves at a good clip from the facts to what the
appellate courts ruled. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu: The Japanese-American Cases,
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249–95 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (virtually no mention of the
lawyers who argued the case in the Supreme Court and no analysis of the briefs they presented to the
Court).
7 See Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 247,
268–69 (2012) (discussing the “underlying problems with the casebook method”).
8 See id. at 272–73 (Second-year “[t]eachers who do the hard work of incorporating active learning
methods do so knowing that their primary institutional reward will come, not from their efforts to improve
what students learn, but from production of scholarship that is of attenuated use to their students”
(footnotes omitted)).
9 Similar trends seem to be at play with online scholarly journals that publish shorter articles. Even
if such online sources prove more diverse in the range of their selections (e.g., they post essays that
scrutinize the work of administrative agencies or examine tax policies), the constant appears to be the
same so far as any serious study of the work-product of lawyers, particularly appellate lawyers.
10

Journals such as The Review of Litigation are the exception.

See Frank D. Wagner, The Role of the Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
9, 16 (2001) (“The practice tapered off and finally ceased during the tenure of Mr. [Ernest] Knaebel in
1941. Office records do not reveal why this occurred.”). See also Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme
Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291,
1328–29 (1985).
11
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Supreme Court cases has received ever less and less attention. In what should
be seen as a disconcerting state of affairs, the official Supreme Court site12
along with some of the leading online websites13 (such as Findlaw and
Cornell’s Legal Information Institute) do not list the names of the attorneys
in the posted opinions of the Supreme Court. Thus, if one were to go the
former’s14 or latter’s15 link on Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission,16 one would have no idea that the attorneys who argued the case
were Theodore Olson (for the Appellant), Elena Kagan (Solicitor General for
the Appellee), Floyd Abrams (for Senator Mitch McConnell, as amicus
curiae in support of Appellant), and Seth Waxman (for Senators John
McCain et al. as amici curiae in support of Appellee).17 Professor Richard
Lazarus has rightly observed that “[w]hat is wholly absent . . . from that
media scrutiny and scholarly commentary is any recognition of the
significance for the Supreme Court and the nation’s laws, of the identity of
the advocates who argue[] before the Court . . . .”18 Of course, this omission
has long been the practice in casebooks, which have for over a century almost
uniformly carved the lawyers out of the case accounts. The implication is that
what the lawyers think—how they conceptualized and analyzed the case—is
of little or no moment. Where such practices constitute the governing norm,
few, if any, students would ever know of the remarkable insight that Robert
L. Carter had when he argued that implicit in the First Amendment is a right
of association,19 the same right later affirmed by Justice John Harlan in his
landmark opinion in NAACP v. Alabama.20
12 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (2013) (not listing lawyers who argued
the case), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1231_32q3.pdf.
13 The same is true of the Justia postings of Supreme Court opinions. See JUSTIA,
http://supreme.justia.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
14 See
Citizens
United
v.
Federal
Election
Commission,
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/08-205.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).

FINDLAW,

15 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH.: LEGAL INFO.
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZS.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
16

558 U.S. 310 (2010).

By and large, the Oyez website still sees value in providing such information. See Citizens
United
v.
Federal
Election
Commission,
OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/20002009/2008/2008_08_205 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
17

18 Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the U.S. Supreme Court: Transforming
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1488 (2008). Lazarus goes on to note “the
emergence of a modern Supreme Court Bar whose expertise in Supreme Court advocacy has quietly
transformed the Court’s docket and its substantive rulings.” Id. For a thoughtful and informed account of
the practice and influence of lawyers who argue before the high Court, see KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE
SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993).
19 See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE: STORIES
ABOUT FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 134–71 (2011) (discussing case history and Robert L. Carter’s
lawyerly involvement in it).
20

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Practically and theoretically speaking, much is lost by this myopic
approach to law. By considering law from the vantage point of the lawyer,21
the study of the law stands to be more holistic;22 it also stands to be enriched
in legal realist ways ranging from constitutional norms to commercial
negotiations. A lawyer’s perspective (be it in estate planning or securities law
counseling) is before the fact of judicial review. For that matter, a good
lawyer will often want to advise her client in such a way as to avoid judicial
intervention. And when judicial review is unavoidable, it is the lawyer who
must then plan the scope of a deposition, or the guidance to be given to a
criminally accused, or the manner of how a case is to be briefed and argued
on appeal duly attentive to existing law.
And then there is this point: as law teachers we put a lot of stock into
how cases are decided and how opinions are structured without fully
appreciating the ways in which the issues were presented to the Justices
beforehand by the lawyers in the case. That is, even accepting a court-centric
model, it might not always be clear why judges decided cases the way they
do without the context of the ways in which the issues were first presented to
them. Even after the fact of judicial review, it is lawyers who must first apply
that judge-announced law to the facts of future cases. As Professor David
Vladeck has rightfully noted:
[L]aw schools fail students by focusing only on opinions and
not briefs. . . . [All too often, law professors fail to ask]
students to read briefs; indeed, I know of no professor who
ever has asked students to read briefs, except, perhaps,
professors who teach appellate advocacy courses. But that
use of briefs is for skills training, not to see how doctrine
evolves. The only mention of briefs in law school is the
mention of Brandeis brief, and that is simply a way of
describing a brilliant advance by a brilliant lawyer.23
And most assuredly, doctrine does evolve in important part by how it is
shaped by lawyers.
21 There is also something to be said, though not much on this occasion, about considering law
from the perspective of lawmakers. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV.
197 (1976).
22 See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All”,
74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1032–33 (1987) (Constitutional history “requires a perspective wide enough to
incorporate the relations between official producers of constitutional law, and those who at particular
times and in particular circumstances resisted or reinterpreted constitutional law.”). Such a holistic
approach is taken in LINDA H. EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
(2012) (discussing strategies used in classic Supreme Court briefs along with descriptions of the lawyers
and the briefs they authored. Cases discussed include Muller, Brown, Loving, Miranda, Gideon, Griswold,
Furman, Lawrence, and Meritor).
23

E-mail from David Vladeck to author (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with author).
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Another reason why the work-product of lawyers is largely absent from
how law is taught and examined has to do with the makeup of the
professoriate in the legal academy. Many law professors come to their
profession with relatively little lawyering experience. Just consider the
“ideal” candidates for teaching slots—young women and men who graduated
from Ivy League schools and then clerked for a federal circuit judge and
thereafter clerked on the United States Supreme Court. Sometimes their
résumés may include a few years in a big firm, but that is more for the
“parsley effect” (i.e., for appearance’s sake). For the most part, the “better
law schools” do not hire practicing lawyers with any meaningful and
extended experience. They hire scholars and teachers.24 But think about it:
why are bright lawyers less inclined to be bright teachers and scholars? Why
does the practice of law count more as a hiring disadvantage than as an
indicator of potential worth?
Scholarship: Perhaps this concern best explains some of the bias against
practicing lawyers and those who discuss their work. Their so-called “nutsand-bolts” take on life and law, so the argument goes, blinds lawyers to the
nuances of “high theory.” There is no “meta” in their understanding of law;
there are no “paradigm shifts” in their views of doctrine; there is no profound
“cost-benefit” appreciation of the law; there are no “normative theories” in
their legal calculations; there is no “gestalt take” in their interpretation of how
law evolves; and there are no “empirical prototypes” in how they do their
work. That, at any rate, may be the general tenor of the bias. The problem
with the bias is threefold: First, it merges the study of law with the study of
philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, and economics. Law is, of
course, related to all of those, but it is more . . . and also less. Second, the bias
assumes that even if law is seen through such heady lenses, practicing
lawyers are unable to appreciate such views of the law—they are too
consumed with the mechanics of law to grasp its weighty jurisprudential side.
As with so many other generalizations in life and law, this bias degrades and
thereby devalues the mindset of some of the best of our lawyers. And finally,
legal scholarship (of the “highest order”) is and must remain theoretical and
not practical (if only to accommodate the wishes of aspirational
philosophers). Where phrases like “democratic competence” and “sociology
of knowledge”25 spice the pages of legal scholarship, there is little desire to

24 See NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE 43–44 (2001) (discussing
character of legal scholarship among professors at elite schools).
25 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern State:
Post’s Republic and the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 369, 374–80 (2012) (critiquing use of such
terminology).
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“ratchet down” into the rhetorical realm of the real.26 Here, too, a dollop of
sober modesty can be salutary: profound thinking need not be wrapped in
perplexing terminology. Clarity of expression, after all, is a sign of clarity of
thought, the kind typical of good lawyering.
Beyond the question of how much legal scholarship speaks to sitting
judges,27 there is also the question of its usefulness, if any, to practicing
lawyers. Even among seasoned appellate lawyers, one wonders how much
contemporary scholarship is useful to them. Additionally, if scholars ignore
the litigation practices of appellate lawyers, then their scholarship’s value is
diminished even more. Here again, there is the problem of the insularity of
much public law scholarship and the audiences to which it is or is not
directed. By that conceptual measure, it seems that too much legal
scholarship neither focuses on litigation nor is concerned with informing
those who practice in the area of public law.28
My primary aim here is not to debunk theoretical scholarship,29 or to
disparage decisional law scholarship, or even to be unduly harsh about the
way law professors teach. Rather, my real concern is to broaden the lens
through which law professors and law students study and understand law.

26 See David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-belawyers.html (“Law schools have long emphasized the theoretical over the useful, with classes that are
often overstuffed with antiquated distinctions, like the variety of property law in post-feudal England.
Professors are rewarded for chin-stroking scholarship, like law review articles with titles like ‘A Future
Foretold: Neo-Aristotelian Praise of Postmodern Legal Theory.’”). In light of such depictions, it is all too
easy to be reminded of Jonathan Swift’s Academy of Lagado and with the disdain its professoriate had
for things practical. For a critical reply to such claims and portrayals, see Brian Leiter, David Segal’s
Hatchet Job on Law Schools…, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2011/11/another-hatchet-job-on-law-schools.html, and Larry
Ribstein, The NYT on Law Teaching, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/11/20/the-nyt-on-law-teaching/ (“The real problem . . . is not that law
professors are teaching theory rather than the way to the courthouse, but that their choices of which
theories to teach pay insufficient attention to the skills and knowledge today’s and tomorrow’s market
demands.”) Here again, some moderation is salutary. That is, whatever the state of education in the legal
academy and the scholarship it produces, can it reasonably be denied that too often too much attention is
devoted to judicial review to the exclusion of the work of lawyers?
27 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL MIND 70 (1996); see also Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 422 (1992)
(“The academic practice of writing for judges, increasingly appears as a degraded art-form used to
communicate with personas who are not listening . . . .”).
28 See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT – AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 5 (1992)
(“Practitioners tend to view much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day
concerns, particularly when compared with the great treatises of an earlier era.”).
29 In all of this, I do not deny the importance of such scholarship, if only because I have done my
small share of it. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 215 (1997)
(deconstructing the thought of a leading deconstructionist).
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Those of us in the legal academy could do much to enhance the educational
experience by paying more attention to how the law is actually applied,
construed, and developed by lawyers.

What to do? Well, the time is ripe for those of us in the academy to
abandon our unfounded biases and open our minds to the rich world of
litigation scholarship. And what exactly is that? Let me paint with a broad
brush, if only for openers.
By litigation scholarship I mean scholarship focusing on the adversarial
process and how practicing lawyers work with clients, strategize with each
other and groups, make arguments in legal documents, examine witnesses,
and interact with trial and appellate judges at the state and federal levels. To
be sure, there is surely more to the lawyering process than that and I do not
mean to deny the importance of things like lawyer counseling, planning, and
various other kinds of non-litigation practice. Those are all areas worthy of
the legal academy’s serious attention. But one must start somewhere, and so
I begin with a focus on litigation. To be more precise, my concerns on this
occasion are with appellate litigation, primarily at the level of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Here, too, I do not wish to devalue the importance
of litigation at the federal or state intermediate appellate levels—indeed,
academic attention in this area is sorely needed. The reason I have selected
the niche that I have is simple: it is the world I now know best, at least at this
stage in my life. As someone who has spent the past few decades working
with lawyers who argue public-law cases (especially First Amendment
freedom of expression ones30) before the High Court, I have learned quite a
bit about that world and those who practice in it. That affiliation has greatly
broadened my understanding of the law; and it has also alerted me to how
deficient my knowledge was without it. Thus, have I come to this scholastic
juncture.
While many scholarly pages—in articles, casebooks, and law-related
books generally—have been devoted to what judges have written in historic
First Amendment cases such as Schenck v. United States,31 Chaplinsky v.

30 For years I was a scholar at the First Amendment Center (part of the Newseum) in Washington,
D.C. While the Center is a non-profit, non-partisan, and non-litigation group committed to educating
Americans about the five freedoms of the First Amendment, it once interacted quite heavily with those
who practice in this area of the law. Today, I work with many First Amendment lawyers, professors, and
journalists in connection with the First Amendment Salons co-hosted with the Floyd Abrams institute for
Freedom of Expression.
31 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND
READER 219–21 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.) (2010) (noting the lawyers who argued the case).
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New Hampshire,32 United States v. Stevens,33 Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association,34 and United States v. Alvarez,35 relatively little has
been or is likely to be said about the lawyers in those cases and even less by
way of any extended analysis of how those cases and many others were
briefed and argued.36 In part, and as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has
observed,37 this is due to the fact that until somewhat recently it was difficult
to access the appellate briefs to examine the work of the lawyers in the
aforementioned cases and others. Thus, previous generations of legal
scholars either had to check with the Supreme Court library, the Library of
Congress, a few other select law libraries, or consult the voluminous
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States
once edited by Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, which only included
briefs from notable cases. But that world is no longer: The more recent of
Supreme Court briefs and transcripts of oral arguments are today readily
accessible online38 at sites such as SCOTUSblog. As for earlier cases, many
law schools now have the Gale Group’s39 complete online compendium of
Supreme Court Records and Briefs from 1832 to 1978. As for lawyers’
profiles, Lexis-Nexis has launched Litigation Profile on Judges, Attorneys,

32

315 U.S. 568 (1942).

559 U.S. 460 (2010). See Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Exceptional Freedom – The Roberts
Court and the New Absolutism, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 409, 424–25 (2013) (discussing briefs and arguments
made by Patricia Millett on behalf of the Respondent).
33

34 564 U.S. 786 (2011). See Collins, supra note 33, at 431 (discussing briefs and arguments made
by Paul M. Smith submitted on behalf of the Petitioner). Subsequently, Mr. Smith filed an amicus brief
on behalf of the National Coalition Against Censorship in support of the Petitioner in Butt v. Utah,
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/12-348-ncacamicus.pdf
(defendant
prosecuted and convicted of violating state harmful materials to minors law re hand-drawn sketches of
himself that were mailed to his wife and to be shared with his then five-year-old daughter).
35 567 U.S. 709 (2012). See Collins, supra note 33, at 435–36 (discussing briefs and arguments
submitted on behalf of the Respondent).
36 But see Ronald K.L. Collins, NUANCED ABSOLUTISM: FLOYD ABRAMS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2013) (discussing and critiquing Floyd Abrams’s manner of arguing First Amendment
cases and causes); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice Brandeis’ Vote
in Whitney v. California, 2005 S. CT. REV. 333 (2005) (discussing appellate lawyers and the arguments
they made in Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California).
37

This by way of a phone conversation we had in early December of 2012.

See Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst & Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating Judicial
Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal
Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2012) (“The increasing availability of digital versions of court
documents, coupled with increases in the power and sophistication of computational methods of textual
analysis, promises to enable both the creation of new avenues of scholarly inquiry and the refinement of
old ones.”).
38

39 See The Making of Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832–1978, GALE,
https://www.gale.com/c/making-of-modern-law-us-supreme-court-records-and-briefs-1832-1978 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019).
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and Experts, which offers a rich selection of information and resources
materials heretofore either unavailable or difficult to compile.40
Hence, we are now able to examine, for example, what arguments Alan
Morrison made on behalf of the Litigation Group41 in his amicus brief in
Bigelow v. Virginia42 and in his merits brief and oral arguments in Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumers Council.43 Important as those briefs
were in those cases, there was much more at stake here than any won-anddone efforts to persuade the Court move on doctrine. That is, Morrison and
the Litigation Group were ongoing participants in the development of
doctrine before the Supreme Court. For example, the Litigation Group filed
briefs in virtually every commercial speech case, each of which bore the
Morrison stamp: for example, he argued Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel44 and then worked with David Vladeck who argued Edenfield v.
Fane.45 Between the two of them, they filed briefs in many of the Court’s
commercial speech cases and in many lower court commercial speech cases
as well. Thus, the Litigation Group’s influence on the development of
commercial speech was significant. Viewed from this vantage point, we can
better understand how the modern-day commercial speech doctrine
developed not merely from the detached mind of Justice Harry Blackmun,
the author of Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, but from the lawyering skills
of a public-interest advocates.46
There is historical value47 in examining the appellate work of lawyers in
such cases. It can help us to better understand how ideas, doctrines, and

40

See Litigation Profile Suite, LEXISNEXIS, https://advance.lexis.com/lpshome/ (last visited Feb.

2, 2019).
41 See Litigation Initiative, PUBLICCITIZEN, http://citizen.org/our-work/litigation (last visited Feb.
2, 2019) (“The Litigation Group is the litigating arm of Public Citizen. The Group works on cases at all
levels of the federal and state judiciaries, and specializes in cases involving regulation, consumer rights,
access to the courts, open government, and the First Amendment, including Internet free speech.”).
42 Brief for Amici Curiae Public Citizen and Center for Women Policy Studies, Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (No. 73-1309), 1974 WL 186260.
43 Brief of Appellees, Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (No. 74-895), 1975 WL 173826; Oral Argument at 22:50, Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer
Council,
Inc.,
425
U.S.
748
(1976)
(No.
74-895),
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger4/oral_argument_audio/16084 via @oyez.
44 Brief of Appellant, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626
(1985) (No. 83-2166), 1984 WL 565570. David Vladeck, then with the Litigation Group, did a lot of the
work on the brief filed with the Court.
45

Brief of Respondent, Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (No. 91-1594), 1992 WL 547197.

See Alan Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s
Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
46

47 See R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482 (1994).
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paradigms in the law originated and developed.48 In that regard consider this:
For all that has been published on Whitney v. California,49 before 2010
relatively little of critical worth was written about how the lawyers for Anita
Whitney argued her case at the trial level.50 More troublesome still is that
historians and others have paid negligible attention to the appellate briefs
prepared on her behalf, which along with other materials could help to
explain Justice Brandeis’s curious concurrence in that case.51 So, too, with
the briefs filed in Lovell v. Griffin52 (a Jehovah’s Witnesses’ case), especially
the amicus one filed by the famed ACLU by Osmond Fraenkel53 assisted by
Francis Biddle,54 the future Attorney General.
There is more: Simply consider something else that has been nearly lost
to history, namely, the farsighted brief prepared in 1975 by then Professor
Hans Linde55 on behalf of the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association. In
his brief to the Oregon Supreme Court Linde successfully argued that limits
on political campaign spending violated the free speech clause of the state
constitution56—this before Buckley v. Valeo57 was handed down. By the same
measure, much stands to be learned about the development of First
Amendment law and campaign financing by tracking and examining the

48 See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & Jennifer Friesen, Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, A.B.A.
J., April 1983, at 294, 294–98, 472–77 (discussing history and importance of the “Brandeis Brief”).
49

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

The exception was HAIG BOSMAJIAN, ANITA WHITNEY, LOUIS BRANDEIS, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 90–124 (Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press ed., 2010). Admirable as its treatment of the
lawyer’s role in the Whitney trial, the book offered no similar treatment of the appellate work in the case.
50

51 But see Collins & Skover, supra note 36, at 349–72, 379–86 (discussing and critiquing appellate
briefs and examining the reasons for J. Brandeis’s concurrence).
52 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The last Jehovah’s Witnesses’ case to be decided by the
Court was Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (a
case not argued by Hayden Covington but by Blanca Bianchi de la Torre).
53 Brief and Motion on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (No. 391), 1938 WL 39268. Among other things, he argued 26 cases in the
Supreme Court, including Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937). See ROGER K. NEWMAN, Osmond K. Fraenkel, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 200 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY].
54 See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 108
(Oxford University Press ed., 1990). Biddle was a law clerk to Justice Holmes and thereafter, among other
things, a Third Circuit Judge, Solicitor General of the United States, and then, in 1941, he served as U.S.
Attorney General (he drafted Exec. Order No. 9066 re the Japanese Internment) and later as served a judge
at the Nuremberg Trials. See GREG ROBINSON, Francis Biddle, in BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 53, at 43–44.
55 Re Hans Linde and his career in American law, see HANS LINDE, INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF HANS LINDE TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3–8 (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995);
Symposium on the Work of Justice Hans Linde, 70 OR. L. REV. 679, 679–906 (1991). Full disclosure: I
clerked for the Judge in 1981.
56

See Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47 (1975).

57

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Supreme Court cases argued by James Bopp,58 who has argued Wisconsin
Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission,59 Randall v. Sorrell,60
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,61 and who wrote the jurisdictional
brief in McCutcheon v. Federal Elections Commission62 along with the
Republican National Committee merits brief63 in that case, among other
cases.
Scholars and students of federalism would find much of interest in the
oral arguments of Solicitor General Robert Bork when he defended, albeit
unsuccessfully, Congress’s expansive powers in National League of Cities v.
Usery.64 “I think this is a very unintrusive statute,” said General Bork in his
exchange with Chief Justice Burger. “[T]here can be no doubt,” he added,
“that interstate is involved when state and local governments in 1971
purchased goods and services worth $135 billion, which was at the time 12%
of our gross national product . . . .”65 And then, in an exchange with Justice
Rehnquist, General Bork further added: “When this Court has over the
centuries attempted to find a formula for confining the Commerce Clause,
[it] has never found an adequate formula. I suggest to you that you will never
find a mechanical bright line distinction that will tell Congress, ‘you may do

58 Among other positions, Mr. Bopp has served as the general counsel for National Right to Life
and as the special counsel for Focus on the Family.
59

Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006).

60

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).

61

Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).

Jurisdictional Statement, McCutcheon v. FEC, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2012 WL
5395232. Mr. Bopp’s role in this case and other cases is discussed in RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER,
WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE MCCUTCHEON CASE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(2014) (ebook).
62

63 See Brief on the Merits for Appellant Republican National Committee, McCutcheon v. FEC,
572
U.S.
185
(2014)
(No.
12-536),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12536_pet_rnc.authcheckdam.pdf. Much the same could just as easily be said of Professor Joel Gora’s work
on the area by way of his First Amendment challenges to campaign finance like those he contested on
behalf of the ACLU in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001); McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003);
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230 (2006); Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007); and
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In all of these cases, the ACLU
filed amicus briefs which were co-authored by Professor Gora. See generally Joel Gora, Campaign
Finance Reform: Still Searching Today for a Better Way, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 137 (1997–1998).
64

426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528

(1985).
65 Oral Argument at 49:23, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1974/1974_74_878.
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this to the states but not do that.’”66 To be sure, there is more to the story, but
such snippets reveal that history can reveal many an important and forgotten
idea or argument.
Additionally, there is that category of legal arguments that was set out
in a brief but was not recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, for whatever
reason. Such arguments, like judicial dissents, can prove immensely
important to lawyers and judges in future cases. Thus, there is both historical
and practical value in such forms of litigation scholarship. There is also
educational value—that is, how we in the legal academy teach law students
how a case is actually argued mindful of the constraints and opportunities
available to lawyers as they argue a given case at a particular time.
Mindful of the importance of such history, the study of First
Amendment law would surely be enhanced if, for example, scholars
considered and students studied Floyd Abrams’s involvement in the
Pentagon Papers Case,67 and likewise how he thereafter successfully argued
Landmark Communications v. Virginia68 and other free expression cases.69
And then there is the need to examine and critique70 the appellate work done
by members of the legal academy, for example:

66

Id. at 01:03:01.

N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY:
TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–61 (2005) (discussing how he worked with Professor Alexander
Bickel in preparing for and briefing case).
67

68

435 U.S. 829 (1978). See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 15–26 (discussing Abrams’s litigation

strategy).
69 Mr. Abrams discusses his litigation practices in his book FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT
LINES WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2013). See also COLLINS, supra note 36.
70 See Adam Liptak, Friend-of-Court Filings Mushroom, and a Law Professor Takes Issue, N.Y.
TIMES. (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/us/law-professor-takes-aim-at-supremecourt-filings.html (“In the [2010-2011] term that . . . , the Supreme Court decided about 80 cases after
briefing and argument. By Professor [Richard] Fallon’s count, it received 56 briefs from groups of law
professors. In the term that ended in 1986, by contrast, the court decided twice as many cases, but it
received only three such briefs.”). The article went on to express some reservations Professor Fallon and
others had about the quality of some of the amicus briefs being submitted by and signed onto by law
professors. See Richard Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 223 (2012) (critiquing the practice of law professors signing onto amicus briefs),

http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_p
olitical_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_070012.pdf; see also Ward Farnsworth,
Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capital from the Legal Academy to
Public, 81 B.U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2001) (proposing “[some] conventions for law professors who render
opinions in the course of public debate, [arguing that] when academics offer public opinions in their
professional capacities they should use the same care and have the same expertise called for in their
published work, or else should disclose that they are adhering to a lesser standard”).
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Thomas Emerson’s merits briefs in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire71 and Griswold v. Connecticut,72 and his
amicus brief in Sweatt v. Painter,73
Herbert Wechsler’s brief in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,74
Mel Nimmer’s brief in Cohen v. California,75
Laurence Tribe’s brief76 in Bowers v. Hardwick77 and
Rust v. Sullivan78 (then Deputy Solicitor General John
Roberts was on the government’s brief in Rust),
the amicus brief submitted by Tribe, John Hart Ely,
Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland and Kathleen
Sullivan in Romer v. Evans,79
Randy Barnett’s co-authored amicus brief in United
States v. Lopez,80
Erwin Chemerinsky’s brief in Tory v. Cochran,81
the amicus brief filed by Eugene Volokh and James
Weinstein in United States v. Alvarez,82

Brief for Appellant, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (No. 175).

Brief for Appellants, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496); see Jonathan Entin, The Law Professor as
Advocate, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 512, 515–22 (1987) (discussing Emerson’s role in litigating Supreme
Court cases).
72

73

Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44).

Brief for Petitioner, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39); see David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph,
66 ALA. L. REV. 229 (2014).
74
75

Brief for Appellant, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 70-299).

Kathleen Sullivan was his co-counsel. For Tribe’s involvement in the case, see JOYCE
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285–
303 (2001) and LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION 252, 254, 258–59,
260–61, 267, 292, 311 (2012).
76

77 Brief for Respondent, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140); see also Linda Edwards, Once Upon
a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 885, 900–07 (2010) (discussing briefs
filed in Hardwick).
78

Brief for Petitioners, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-1391).

Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, & Kathleen M.
Sullivan, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), discussed in
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Dissent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 1, 117 (1997)
(“[The majority’s] argument seems to draw on an amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court by Laurence
Tribe and four other eminent constitutional law scholars (including Ely).”).
79

80

Amicus Brief on Behalf of: Academics for the Second Amendment, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No.

93-1260).
81 Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (No. 03-1488); see also Amicus Curiae
Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the U.S. Congress, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(No. 02-575), discussed in Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue
not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2004).
82 Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh & James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210). Subsequently, Professor Volokh represented the petitioner in Butt v.
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the brief filed by Jack Balkin et al. in Shelby County v.
Holder,83
the influential amicus brief submitted on behalf of
Walter Dellinger and authored by Irving Gornstein84 in
Hollingsworth v. Perry,85
the amicus brief filed by Seth Waxman on behalf of
Charles Fried and Robert Post in Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31,86
in the securities law world, there is the virtually
unnoticed brief filed by Professor Tribe in Bulldog
Investors General Partnership v. Galvin87 wherein it
was argued that a state ban on truthful speech by an
issuer of unregistered securities to members of the

Utah, cert denied, 568 U.S. 1192 (2013) (defendant prosecuted and convicted of violating state harmful
materials to minors law re hand-drawn sketches of himself that were mailed to his wife and to be shared
with his then five-year-old daughter), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/12348-petition.pdf. Professor Volokh’s many and impressive briefs are alone worthy of a scholarly article.
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Eagle Forum et al., Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946 (Ind. 2014)
(challenging constitutionality of criminal intimidation law as applied to a man who criticized a sitting
judge re a child custody dispute in which he was involved); see also Brief for Respondent, Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (No. 15-1293).
83 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Scholars & Constitutional Accountability Center in
Support of Respondents, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, (2013) (No. 12-96) (Jack Balkin, Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, and Adam Winkler).
84 See Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents on the Issue of
Standing at 34, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (No. 12-144).
85 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013). Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority opinion
seems to be heavily influenced by the arguments advanced in detail in the Gornstein amicus brief.
86 Brief for Amici Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Pose in Support of Neither Party, Janus v.
Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466).
87

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bulldog Inves. Gen. P’ship v. Galvin, 566 U.S. 987 (2012) (No.

11-954).
A book that is long overdue is one that would document and discuss the roles played by noted First
Amendment lawyers in developing our free speech law—lawyers such as Theodore Schroeder, Walter H.
Pollak, Leonard B. Boudin, Hayden Covington, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Ephraim London, Stanley
Fleishman, Jack Greenberg, William Kunstler, Bruce Ennis, John W. Weston, Floyd Abrams, and Eleanor
Holmes Norton (she was the first woman to argue a First Amendment free expression case on behalf of a
rights claimant in the Supreme Court: Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)) and Robert CornRevere, among others.
By way of another book idea, someone might select, say, twelve noted scholars who submitted briefs
to the Supreme Court and discuss how they argued the law and how the Court ultimately interpreted it.
See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). On a related front, there is
also the line of cases in which renowned scholars argued cases before they began teaching. For example,
Kent Greenawalt (a noted professor of constitutional law, criminal law and jurisprudence) originally
argued United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (an obscenity case argued and reargued) on behalf of
the government. In a 5-4 judgment, the government prevailed.
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public based upon their financial status violated the First
Amendment,
the amicus briefs in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission filed by the Solicitor
General’s Office,88 Evan Young89 (for Cake artists),
Robert Corn-Revere90 (for the First Amendment
Lawyers Association), Steven Shiffrin91 (for Freedom of
Speech Scholars), Anna P. Engh92 (for National
Women’s Law Center), and John Paul SchnapperCasteras93 (for NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund), and the certiorari petition filed in 2018 by C.
Boyden Gray in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and
Industries,94 and
finally, there is much to be gained by scholars exploring
the work-product of federal government lawyers such
those who urged a court to sanction a local police
department for violating citizens’ First, Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.95

88 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
89 Brief for Cake Artists as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
90 Brief of Amicus Curiae the First Amendment Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
91 Brief for Freedom of Speech Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
92 Brief of the Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. & Other Groups as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No.
16-111).
93 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
94 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 Ore. App. 507
(2017) (another cake case).
95 See Statement of Interest of the U.S., Sharp v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02-888BEL
(D. Md., Jan. 10, 2012), at 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/Sharp_SOI_110-12.pdf. In this statement, the lawyer for the Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General’s office
urged a federal district court to sanction a local police department for abridging First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In relevant part, Mr. Thomas Perez of the Civil Rights Division argued:

This litigation presents constitutional questions of great moment in this digital age: whether private
citizens have a First Amendment right to record police officers in the public discharge of their duties,
and whether officers violate citizens’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they seize and
destroy such recordings without a warrant or due process. The United States urges this Court to
answer both of those questions in the affirmative. The right to record police officers while
performing duties in a public place, as well as the right to be protected from the warrantless seizure
and destruction of those recordings, are not only required by the Constitution. They are consistent
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The scope of scholarly possibilities broadens the more one reflects on
the range and value of this kind of study. For example, such scholarship might
focus on the appellate work done by justices or judges before they were
elevated to the bench. In this respect, consider the brief John Roberts
authored when he was at Hogan and Hartson and represented the petitioner
in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency.96 Though he did not prevail,97 one might
ask how his views of federalism as argued in his brief might fare in today’s
legal climate. Admittedly, he was an advocate. But that fact alone does not
discount the possible merit of the arguments he tendered in that case and the
value of scrutinizing such arguments under then existing law and likewise
under current law. There are also the brief and arguments that then Assistant
Solicitor General, Samuel Alito, tendered in the case of Federal
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California.98
Here again, though he argued the case as a government lawyer, nonetheless
there are some noteworthy arguments he advanced that might warrant future
scrutiny—for example, the distinctions he made in that case between
commercial broadcasting and public broadcasting.99 In both cases, the focus
is on the arguments advanced and what they tell us about how we might or
might not conceptualize any variety of areas of law. By the same measure,
there is much to be gained by studying the work done by the attorneys in the
Solicitor General’s Office and how that work directs the development of the
law in the Supreme Court.100

with our fundamental notions of liberty, promote the accountability of our governmental officers,
and instill public confidence in the police officers who serve us daily.
Id. at 1 (noting enforcement of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141, which authorizes the Attorney General to file lawsuits seeking court orders to reform police
departments engaging in a pattern or practice of violating citizens’ federal rights. The United States also
enforces the anti-discrimination provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.). Notably, this Statement of Interest was subsequently relied
upon in a case involving the same general issue but in a different county in Maryland. See Garcia v.
Montgomery Cty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D. Md. 2015) (Robert Corn-Revere was the attorney for the
plaintiff).
96 Brief for Petitioner, Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (No. 02658) (holding the EPA has the authority under the Clean Air Act to overrule state agencies re whether a
company is using the “best available controlling technology” to prevent pollution).
97 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004). The vote was 5-4 with Justice
Kennedy in dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
98

FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).

See Professor Lisa McElroy Examines U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito’s Historic Oral
Arguments
on
C-SPAN
Radio,
EARL
MACKE
(Jan.
2,
2013),
http://earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/news/drexel_law_news/in_the_news/2013-Archive/Mcelroy-Alito01022013/.
99

100 See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 134–36 (2012); see also
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If scholars pay relatively little attention to the work of lawyers,
especially appellate lawyers, then they are unlikely to have a rich
appreciation about how our system of justice actually works. Take, for
example, the elite bar of lawyers who litigate cases before the high Court.
What do we know about that bar and their impact on certain areas of law?101
Who are the main players in it? What do we know about the allocation of
cases by the various firms?102 What about the way a case finds its way to the
Supreme Court and the role played by lawyers in the process?103 Though
much needs to be done to answer such questions, we do have some important
information tendered by Professor Richard Lazarus, who in an important
2008 article noted:
The [modern] transformation of the [Supreme Court] Bar
began when Sidley Austin hired Rex Lee, following his
resignation as President Ronald Reagan’s first Solicitor
General in the summer of 1985, to create a Supreme Court

Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the
Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1183, 1183 (2014).
By the same token, much is to be learned about the development of the law by examining the
appellate work of certain organizations that submit briefs to the Supreme Court. See Tony Mauro, A Strong
Supreme Court Term for Business, NATIONAL L.J., (2012) (the litigation arm of the Chamber of
Commerce “counted eight wins in the 13 cases last term in which it filed amicus briefs. In four of the other
cases, the Court did not reach the issue that the [Chamber of Commerce] briefed, and in the 13th case, the
Chamber did not take a side.”). In the October 2006 Term, the Chamber of Commerce won “thirteen out
of fifteen cases, which appears to be directly traceable to the rise of the modern Supreme Court Bar.”
Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1490–91.
101 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 232 (2012)
(“[T]he NEPA cases . . . suggest that there is an increasing risk that the Court’s [environmental] docket
and rulings are being skewed in favor of commercial interests because of the disproportionate ability of
those interests to retain expert Supreme Court advocates.”).
102 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1499–501 (providing a general overview of some of the
leading firms who argued before the Court as of 2008).
103 The statistics are striking. While the number of merits cases has roughly declined by one-half
during the past three decades, the influence of the expert Supreme Court bar over the plenary docket
during this same time period has increased approximately tenfold; expert practitioners represent the
successful petitioner at the jurisdictional stage in more than fifty percent of the cases.
Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 199 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 90 (2009). Moreover:

Interviews with former clerks confirm the obvious: the clerks pay special attention to the petitions
filed by prominent Supreme Court advocates and to the amicus briefs those advocates succeed in
having filed in support of review. When they see the name of an attorney whose work before the
Court they know, at least by reputation, that attorney’s involvement in the case, by itself, conveys
an important message about the significance of the legal issues being presented and the credibility
of the assertions being made.
Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1526. And more needs to be said about the entrepreneurial and/or ideological
zeal with which some of the lawyers in leading cases round up clients and ensure their own roles as lead
counsel, etcetera, in important appellate cases. See generally MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2013).
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and appellate practice in Sidley’s D.C. office. Lee set out to
establish a highly visible Supreme Court and appellate
practice that could provide to private sector clients the kind
of outstanding expert advocacy that the Solicitor General’s
Office had provided federal agencies. Lee was enormously
successful from the outset. During the second half of
October Term 1985, almost immediately after leaving office,
Lee presented two oral arguments. And then during October
Term 1986, the first full Term after Lee’s post-government
recusal period had expired, he presented oral argument in six
different cases before the Court—then a strikingly high
number for a private sector lawyer and effectively matching
the number of arguments typically presented by the Solicitor
General himself. And, in every case but one, Lee represented
the petitioner who had successfully obtained Supreme Court
review.104
That insight by the Sidley Austin law firm has proven to be the template
for much of the modern Supreme Court bar practice. So far as that elite bar
is concerned, how many people of color argue cases before the high Court?
Is there any corresponding effort to improve the quality of advocacy for the
criminally accused that appear before the Court?105 And what about women
and their advocacy before the High Court? As to the last point, we have the
following observation concerning the workings of the Supreme Court bar:
Much like the Justices who sit on the Court and the law
clerks who serve the Justices, the advocates who appear
before the Court represent a fairly homogeneous group
primarily consisting of white males. For example, one study
concluded that, for the 1993 to 2001 Terms, only 150 (13.91
percent) of the 1,078 attorneys arguing cases orally before
the U.S. Supreme Court were women, even though 2000

104 Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1498 (footnotes omitted). Notably, Lazarus adds: “In one single
Term before the Supreme Court, the former Solicitor General had accomplished what no one had done for
decades and what the Bar had assumed was no longer economically feasible: he had developed a highly
profitable Supreme Court practice on behalf of private sector corporate business clients.” Id. at 1498–99.
105

The Court, Professor Lazarus has argued:

[S]hould itself take steps to reduce the advocacy gap. [It] can do so by appointing expert Supreme
Court advocates in criminal defense cases where counsel is lacking more frequently. And the Court
can promote better legal arguments by more readily agreeing to allow organizations represented by
outstanding advocates to present oral argument as amicus curiae.
Id. at 1562. See also Lazarus, supra note 103, at 95–97 (suggesting for reforms at the jurisdictional stage
of review at the Supreme Court).
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statistics put the percent of female members in the national
bar at 27 percent.106
Why is this so?107 What percentage of the women lawyers are
government lawyers? And what do we in the legal academy know about the
work-product of such important Supreme Court litigators such as Patricia
Millett108 and other notable female members of that bar?109 Or to echo an
earlier point, what do we know about the history of women lawyers such as
Olive Rabe who in 1929 argued United States v. Schwimmer?110 The answer:
we know relatively little about that history and how the women of the
Supreme Court bar have argued any variety of cases.111
There is one more thing: The arc of legal education in America is
changing. That is, the curve of legal education is moving away from
doctrinal/analytical/theoretical archetypes and ever more towards
experiential or practice-oriented forms of education. To be sure, there will
always be black-letter law and bar exams and all that entails. But such forms
of education will likely exist in the caldron of experiential kinds of teaching.
If such a change should occur, it could be only a matter of time before it has
a spillover effect on legal scholarship. In that brave new world, the
scholarship of the likes of Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, John Rawls,

106 RICHARD SEAMON, ANDREW SIEGEL, JOSEPH THAI & KATHRYN WATTS, THE SUPREME
COURT SOURCEBOOK 597–98 (2013).
107 See Tammy A. Sarver, Erin B. Kaheny & John J. Szmer, The Attorney Gender Gap in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation, 91 JUDICATURE 238, 242 (2008).
108 See Patricia Millett Confirmed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, AKIN GUMP
(December 10, 2013), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/patricia-millett-confirmed-to-u-scourt-of-appeals-for-the-d-c.html (Ms. Millett had argued 31 cases before the Supreme Court). In June
2013, President Obama nominated Ms. Millett for a seat on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, for which the Senate confirmed her. Id.
109 See generally Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Supreme Court Advocates of the Twenty-First Century, 1
J. LEGAL METRICS 561, 575 (2013) (listing top 11 women Supreme Court litigators). Maureen Mahoney,
a former law clerk to Justice Rehnquist and now a retired partner at Latham & Watkins, has herself had a
notable impact on the development of law in the Supreme Court. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP,
http://www.lw.com/people/maureen-mahoney (last visited Nov. 7, 2018); Richard J. Lazarus, The Power
of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court: Reflections on Nepa’s Zero for Seventeen Record at
the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 251 (2012) (noting Mahoney’s influence at the jurisdictional
stage in an important environmental law case).
110 See generally United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Apart from pro se cases,
Olive Rabe was the first woman to argue a free speech case in the Court, though the case was not formally
decided on First Amendment grounds. See Ronald Collins & David Hudson, Remembering Two Forgotten
Women in Free-speech History, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (June 27, 2008) (no longer available on Internet).
111 See Ronald K.L. Collins, 38 Women Who Argued First Amendment Free Expression Cases in
the
Supreme
Court:
1880-2018,
FIRST
AMEND.
NEWS
(Aug.
17,
2018),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/08/fan-199-first-amendment-news-special-issue-38women-who-argued-first-amendment-free-expression-cases-in-the-supreme-court-1880-2018.html.
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Roberto Unger, and Joseph Raz (impressive as it was) may begin to vanish112
(at least for a time) like the memories of those who drank from the River of
Lethe.113 We tend to forget the past; we tend to embrace the present; and we
move forward as the conventions of our times point us.
Holmes put it laconically: “When we study law we are not studying a
mystery but a well-known profession.”114 But that it were so. If truth be
revealed, much legal scholarship seems more interested in the mystery of the
law than in the profession of the law—i.e. with how practitioners profess it.
In the end, law (like life) is what we make it. The question is always, of
course, who exactly is that we? Incredibly, too many in the academy have
lost sight of them, both in our scholarship and teaching. Bringing lawyers
back into that we perspective can only augment the value of legal scholarship,
while at the same time enhancing the worth of legal education generally. To
that end, my aim is to further inform legal scholars of the importance of such
scholarship, to alert them to the rich possibilities for academic work in this
area, and to suggest to them what this portends for legal education. The hope
is that this will begin a vibrant and insightful dialogue concerning a long
overdue and long neglected area of study. If so, the law may seem less
mysterious and more meaningful.
All of which brings us back to Hayden C. Covington, one of the most
influential figures in the history of First Amendment law. Beyond the
numerous First Amendment cases he argued or co-argued in the Supreme
Court, he also prevailed on behalf of the Witnesses in over “100 decisions
handed down by various state supreme courts, and . . . also triumphed in
dozens of lower federal court rulings.”115
Even so, we know relatively little about Hayden Covington. One will
look long and hard to find his name in any First Amendment treatise or
casebook. Simply consider the following observation made by Jennifer
Jacobs Henderson in her PhD dissertation on the Witnesses and their First
Amendment cases:
Hayden Covington, the Witnesses’ lawyer for all but one of
the literature distribution and permit cases that reached the
Supreme Court, is strangely absent from discussion in
112 Of course, I do not applaud this possible scenario as I think that the study of law, like the study
of liberal arts generally, should not be confined to skills training simply but rather includes knowledge of
matters related to the human condition more generally. By this measure, Plato’s Laws is as much a book
of philosophy as it is one about rules and regulations concerning the governance of the polis.
113 Lethe was one of the five rivers in Hades that flowed past the cave of Hypnos and into the
Underworld. As Greek mythology has it, those who drank from Lethe’s waters lost all memory. See
HARALD WEINRICH, LETHE: THE ART AND CRITIQUE OF FORGETTING 6–7 (Steven Rendall trans., 2004).
114
THE

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).

SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND
DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 127 (2000).
115
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[virtually all] First Amendment analyses. It is as if the cases
were cultivated, argued and won without legal counsel. The
focus of these works is clearly how the Jehovah’s Witnesses
cases shaped the law, not on who shaped the law.116
In light of this and what I have written above, now we have some idea
why the litigation aspect of Supreme Court cases is so strikingly absent from
contemporary legal scholarship. What remains is the story of Hayden
Covington, a sketch of which follows.

Covington’s tireless efforts helped usher in a new era
in American constitutional jurisprudence, the “rights
revolution” that reached its peak in the 1960s.
– Shawn Francis Peters117
Consider the following mainstays of modern First Amendment and
constitutional law:
•
•
•
•

The incorporation doctrine118
The state action doctrine as applied to the First
Amendment119
The preferred position doctrine120
The least restrictive means doctrine121

What do those four cases in which those doctrines were formulated have
in common? Was it that the same jurist wrote all of the opinions in them?
Was that it? To ask the question is to answer it. The common denominator in
these cases, among others, is that the same man (Hayden Covington) argued
all of them and all of them involved the same rights claimants (Jehovah’s

116 Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, Hayden Covington, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Plan to
Expand First Amendment Freedoms (July 29, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Washington) 30.
117 SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, Hayden Covington, in BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 53,
at 132 [hereinafter PETERS].
118

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S.
517, 520 (1946) (companion case reversing trespass conviction regarding door-to-door proselytizing in a
town owned by an agency of the federal government).
119

120 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting), vacated, 319 U.S.
103 (1943) (per curiam).
121

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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Witnesses).122 “In the mid-twentieth century, Covington handled as many as
50 major cases every year involving the civil liberties of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, who frequently faced persecution because of their uncommon
beliefs and often provocative behavior.” 123 There is more to the story,
including Covington’s role in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.124 But that is to get ahead of the man and his legacy; more backdrop
is needed.
In 1933, Hayden Covington was admitted to the Texas bar. His
admission preceded his completion of law school at the San Antonio Bar
Association School of Law (later St. Mary’s University Law School). This
son of a Texas Ranger spent his early practice defending insurance
companies. But after attending a Witness convention125 in New York and
after arguing some early Witnesses’ cases in Texas, he soon became one of
its lawyers, and then one of its lead attorneys.126 It was an era of great hostility
towards the Witnesses. “Between 1933 and 1951, there were 18,866 arrests
of American Witnesses and about 1,500 cases of mob violence against
them.”127 Such hostility, as Covington later recalled, was both extreme and
life threatening:
[In Connersville, Indiana it] was a mob situation that
occurred while we were trying that seditious conspiracy case
in Connersville, a hot bed of American Legion action and
they ruled the whole town. In the Connersville case I used
Brother Franz as my witness and then the jury was put on
and it was necessary for me to get to out the case and I
finished the argument of the case at Connersville and I tried
to get a postponement of the case in Maine but they wouldn’t
put it off. As result I had to race from Indianapolis to
Cincinnati to catch the plane to Boston and that saved my
life because that night they had conspired to kill me. I went
to catch the airplane in Cincinnati out of Connersville, and
then Brother Victor Schmidt, who was with me as co122 In identifying these various doctrines, I do not mean to say that Mr. Covington was the
originator of them but rather that he brought the Witnesses’ controversies to the Court in which these
doctrines were formulated.
123

PETERS, supra note 117, at 132.

124

See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Henderson, supra note 116, at 70; see also M. JAMES PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED: THE
STORY OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES 79 (2nd ed. 1997) (In 1934 at the age of 23, Covington was baptized a
Witness).
125

126 PETERS, supra note 117, at 132; see also Henderson, supra note 117, at 67–74 (detailing
Covington’s introduction to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, their faith and followers, and his early litigation of
Witnesses’ cases).
127

PENTON, supra note 125, at 88.
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coun[sel], he is now dead, he stayed. And he and his wife.
Sister Schmidt, were mobbed by the crowed [sic] and as they
mobbed them that night, in the darkness, after the case was
over, they were screaming and yelling that they were going
to kill me that night. The Lord delivered me at the right time
and I would have been killed that night.128
A January 1940 report by the ACLU took note of that religious animus
against the Witnesses:
Not since the persecution of the Mormons years ago has any
religious minority been so bitterly and generally attacked as
the members of Jehovah’s Witnesses—particularly the
spring and summer of 1940. While this was the peak of the
attacks upon them, hostility and discrimination have been
rife for several years. Documents filed with the Department
of Justice by attorneys for Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
American Civil Liberties Union showed over three hundred
thirty-five instances of mob violence in forty-four states
during 1940, involving one thousand four hundred eightyeight men, women, and children.129
Long hours and dangerous work were his lawyerly trade. By 1942,
Covington had earned the title of “chief legal counsel.” Following the death
of Joseph F. Rutherford (president of the Witnesses’ Watch Tower
Society),130
Covington took over all Supreme Court appeals for the
organization. While he had argued many cases before the
Supreme Court prior to this time, Rutherford’s death left him
firmly in charge of the Witnesses’ constitutional battles.
During one week in 1943, Covington argued fourteen cases
before the United States Supreme Court.131

128 See Full text of “Hayden C. Covington Interview”, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Nov. 19, 1978),
https://archive.org/stream/HaydenCCovingtonInterview/HaydenCovingtonInterview_djvu.txt
[hereinafter Covington Interview] (“It was an eighteen hour day for me to cope with [all the cases], but I
was young and dedicated and devouring of any opposition that we had. I kept on going all the time.”).
129 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE PERSECUTION OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES 3 (1941); Jennifer
Jacobs Henderson, The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Plan to Expand First Amendment Freedoms, 46 J.
CHURCH & ST. 811, 820–21 (2004) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Henderson II] (“A Life magazine
article published in 1940 noted that the American Civil Liberties Union was involved in more than 200
cases representing more than 1,300 Witnesses.”).
130 M. JAMES PENTON, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES AND THE THIRD REICH: SECTARIAN POLITICS
UNDER PERSECUTION 363 (2004) (“During his years as president of the Watch Tower Society, J.F.
Rutherford ruled that organization–and, eventually, Jehovah’s Witnesses–with a rod of iron.”).
131

Henderson, supra note 116, at 73–74 (footnote omitted).
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Thereafter, his name was forever linked with that of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.132
The group’s zeal, unorthodoxy, and persistence made it an easy target
for social ostracism,133 especially when it came to matters such as patriotism.
Consider, for example, the following tenet of their faith:
Nowhere in the New Testament is Patriotism (a
narrowminded hatred of other peoples) encouraged.
Everywhere and always murder in its every form is
forbidden; and yet, under the guise of Patriotism the civil
governments of earth demand of peace-loving men the
sacrifice of themselves and their loved ones and the butchery
of their fellows, and hail it as a duty demanded by the laws
of heaven.134

132 William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah’s
Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997, 1003 (1987) (“The name, ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses,’
was not formally adopted until 1931 when the group was about fifty years old. The organization had been
incorporated in 1884 as ‘Zion’s Watch Tower Tract Society;’ this was then changed in 1896 to the ‘Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society.’ In 1909, a separate corporation was formed in New York, ‘The People’s
Pulpit Association;’ its name was changed in 1956 to ‘Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of New York,
Inc.’”) (footnotes omitted).
133 Allen Rostron, Demythologizing the Legal History of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the First
Amendment: Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution,
22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493, 522 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“[The Witnesses] did not have the ‘quiet and
reserved personality’ of the Amish. In addition, the Witnesses’ attitude toward the state was unequivocally
hostile. For them, the secular nations were instruments of Satan, undeserving of any form of submission,
and to be tolerated with loathing only when absolutely necessary. The Witnesses were determined to
worship God as they believed they should, and even gained special satisfaction from doing so in defiance
of the law. Negotiation and compromise were tactics of last resort. Compromising would merely have
deprived them of the opportunity to wage a good fight for Jehovah.”).
134 McAninch, supra note 132, at 1008 (quoting 1974 Yearbook of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Part 1—
United States of America, WATCHTOWER ONLINE LIBRARY, https://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lpe/301975002 (last visited Nov. 9, 2018)).
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Hayden Covington (credit: Watchtower Bible & Tract Society)

As early as 1918, the government viewed that kind of pacifism as a real
and serious threat to the nation’s security:
One of the most dangerous examples of this sort of
propaganda is the book called ‘The Finished Mystery,’ a
[Jehovah’s Witnesses’] work written in extremely religious
language and distributed in enormous numbers. The only
effect of it is to lead soldiers to discredit our cause and to
inspire a feeling at home of resistance to the draft.135
Hence, even before the famous 1943 Barnette decision, the Witnesses
were often viewed as vile, both for their religious beliefs and for their
purported unpatriotic attitudes toward America. These, then, were Hayden

135

Id. at 1009.

On May 7, 1918 federal warrants were issued for President Rutherford, the general manager, the secretarytreasurer, the two compilers of The Finished Mystery, and three other members of the Society’s
editorial committee for violation of the 1917 Espionage Act. They were charged with conspiring to
cause insubordination in the military, conspiring to obstruct the recruiting service, attempting to
cause insubordination in the military, and obstructing the recruiting service . . . The government’s
evidence consisted primarily of the publications mentioned in the indictment and a record of a
meeting of the society’s board of directors at which The Finished Mystery was discussed. The
government avoided the difficulty posed by the fact that the book had been written before the
enactment of both the Draft Act and the Espionage Act of 1917 by arguing that its continued sale
after the acts’ effective dates was sufficient. The jury was convinced, and each defendant was
convicted on every count.
Id. at 1010–11 (footnotes omitted).
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Covington’s clients. When their flag-salute case came before the Supreme
Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940),136 George K. Gardner
(a Harvard Law Professor with the ACLU)137 and Joseph Rutherford argued
the matter unsuccessfully for the Witnesses (the vote was 8-1). That may well
have seemed to be the end of the matter—defeat by a large margin.
Defeat, however, did not dissuade him: he petitioned the Supreme Court
no fewer than 111 times.138 That said, between “1938 and 1958, the Supreme
Court heard more than fifty cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, deciding
the vast majority of them in the Witnesses’ favor.”139 Hayden Covington was
a key player in many of those cases. In the period between 1939 and 1955,
he brought forty-five First Amendment cases involving free speech, press,
and religion before the Supreme Court.140 Like Thurgood Marshall and the
plan developed by the NAACP in race cases, Covington and Rutherford
formulated a First Amendment litigation strategy by which to foster, try,
appeal, and then prevail in a variety of free expression cases. To do that, one
needed the right plaintiffs141 and the right facts, something that the Witnesses,
thanks to their legal counsel, did not leave to chance.142 As Jennifer Jacobs
Henderson has noted:
Between 1938 and 1953, the Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society published several tracts and booklets providing legal
advice and guidance to Jehovah’s Witnesses. Written by
136

See generally Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

M. JAMES PENTON, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES AND THE THIRD REICH: SECTARIAN POLITICS
UNDER PERSECUTION 129 (2nd ed. 2004) (“George K. Gardner . . . made the legal arguments for the
Witnesses’ side far better than Rutherford. But neither Rutherford’s poor performance nor Gardner’s more
able one seemed to have any impact on the court, except for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.”).
137

138 THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 132 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009)
(quoting SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE
DAWN OF RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000)).
139 Rostron, supra note 133, at 493 (citing Clement E. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure
Group Activity, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 20, 22 (1958)) (ranking Jehovah’s Witnesses
with the NAACP as one of the most effective and frequent of organizations involved in constitutional
litigation); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888–1986, 261–68, 313–20 (1990) (compiling cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses); see also
Joseph F. Zygmunt, Jehovah’s Witnesses in the U.S.A. 1942-1976, 24 SOC. COMPASS 45, 47 (1977)
(reporting 3,500 cases tried in state courts and 200 appealed to higher courts by Witnesses by 1946).
140

PENTON, supra note 125, at 88.

See MARLEY COLE, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: THE NEW WORLD SOCIETY 110 (1955)
(explaining that Covington assured Witnesses that “You are writing your faith into the laws of the land.”).
141

142 Jerry Bergman, Hayden Covington: Attorney and Watchtower Society Vice President, (Nov.
2004), http://ed5015.tripod.com/JwCovington99.htm (“Covington looked for cases and people who could
win. They would interview a person and conclude, ‘He’s not quite right. He loses his cool and is not very
articulate.’ They wanted people who had good reputations in the community, who were store owners, or
shopkeepers that had a good chance of winning. They tried to eliminate all extraneous things that are
brought up in court cases. They wanted women, especially presentable, attractive women who were
articulate and had children who they felt would elicit sympathy from the jury.”).
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Judge Rutherford, president of the Watchtower Bible and
Tract Society, and Olin R. Moyle and Hayden C. Covington,
Jehovah’s Witness legal counsel, these tracts informed
Witnesses of their legal rights to proselytize. They also
explained how they could avoid arrest, how they should
respond once arrested, how to prepare for trial once arrested
and what arguments to use in preparing court briefs.143
When Covington assumed the reins of legal power for the Witness, the
Watchtower legal department was a small but active one: there was the chief
counsel, several legal assistants, and clerical help.
The legal department was not proactive . . . until Hayden
Covington arrived. Covington’s first task was to develop a
legal strategy as aggressive as [his predecessor’s] spiritual
one. The first step of his plan was to identify local
communities where Witnesses faced legal roadblocks to
their ministry.144
Moreover, and as Professor Henderson observed:
Covington would determine which communities were
targeted for intensive fieldwork, and thus, potential future
litigation. Covington would “send people into areas they
knew would be a problem, specially if there was a large
Catholic population,” “an active priest,” or “previous
opposition.” Covington would simply inform a certain
congregation that they needed to preach in a certain
territory,145 often adding, “It hasn’t been preached in
awhile.”
Covington also delighted in telling his Witness clients they were
“writing [their] faith into the laws of the land.”146 While that was stretch, it
was nonetheless true that the practice of their faith led to a series of cases
(most argued by Covington) that changed the law of the land.

143

Henderson, supra note 116, at 26 (footnotes omitted).

144

Henderson II, supra note 129, at 816–17 (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 818 (“The job of these Witnesses, in addition to spreading the word of God, was to get
arrested, thus clogging the local jail and legal system and freeing up local members to return to their work.
By replacing local members with mobile Witnesses in the jails, Covington was able to ensure that the
Watchtower could continue to spread the Word of God and generate test cases. With law enforcement and
court officials tied up in processing the newly arrived Witnesses, local Witness members were free to
continue proselytizing. The mobile Witnesses, recently arrested under the same questionable ordinances,
provided new opportunities for trial and appeal.”) (footnotes omitted).
145

146

Henderson, supra note 116, at 83 (footnote omitted).
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Then there was the working alliance the Witnesses’ legal counsel forged
with the ACLU in developing key arguments and how best to appeal a case.147
Covington also had the legal savvy to link the plight of his client
pamphleteers to that of the mainstream media.148 He had a way of linking
secular First Amendment claims to religious ones. By this measure, he was
able to recruit the favor of both press groups and civil liberties ones.
Consider, for example, what he wrote in his brief in Schneider v. Irvington149:
“What mysterious quality can there be in the principles of constitutional law
which prohibits licensing or censoring of the press but authorizes a license
for preaching the gospel of God’s kingdom?”150
Largely because of such factors, among others, Covington (an 18-hour
day workhorse151) “had a success rate before the United States Supreme
Court higher than any man except former NAACP attorney and Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, claiming victory in 36 of 42 Supreme
Court cases.”152 Even so, though Zechariah Chafee, Jr. devoted a section of
his Free Speech in the United States to the Witnesses’ cases (titled “Peddlers
of Ideas”153), he was doctrinally unsympathetic to their claims154 and found
no reason to mention Hayden Covington, which even if he had his portrayal
would have been a uncomplimentary one.
Beyond his successful strategies for identifying good-fact cases and then
taking them up on appeal (a critical talent), when it came to his Supreme
Court manner, Covington was often more style than substance. For example,
a reporter for Newsweek commenting on his argument in Cantwell v.
Connecticut (1940)155 portrayed his style this way:

147

See id. at 26.

See Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (No. 280), 1941 WL
52767, quoted in Henderson, supra note 116, at 168 (“There is no difference between proportionately
taxing the publishing corporation having the larger circulation and imposing the license tax or fee upon a
boy or other person distributing pamphlets or leaflets. The result, regardless of motives, is to discourage,
hinder or destroy circulation.”).
148

149

Brief for Petitioner, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (No. 11), 1939 WL 48518.

150

Id. at 32.

See Covington Interview, supra note 128 (“It was an eighteen hour day for me to cope with [all
the cases], but I was young and dedicated and devouring of any opposition that we had. I kept on going
all the time.”).
151

152 Henderson, supra note 116, at 67, 74–75 (referencing “18–20 hour” days); see also SAMUEL
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 107 (1990) (discussing that
Thurgood Marshall won 29 of 32 cases before the Supreme Court as the lead attorney for the NAACP’s
Legal Defense Fund).
153

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 398–409 (1941).

But that would change when Chafee included his name on an amicus brief filed by the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association in support of the Witnesses in the
Barnette case. See text accompanying notes 179–183 infra.
154

155

PETERS, supra note 117, at 132.
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A precedent-buster extraordinary, the 6-foot lawyer erupted
into the austere chamber in a bright green suit with padded
shoulders and red plaid tie. Locking his hands behind his
back and bending his body into a right angle, or tucking his
thumbs into his green vest and lifting his head, he roared,
first at the black-robed justices and then at the audience:
“Jehovah’s Witnesses are plain people who derive their
authority to preach the truth from Jehovah himself, not from
organized wealthy groups. Many of them are poor and
uneducated.” Then, glowering at Justice Murphy, a Catholic:
“They don’t preach in a dead language.”156
His charismatic style notwithstanding, Covington prevailed in Cantwell
and in many other First Amendment cases as well. For example, his strategy
and style helped him to prevail in such important cases as Marsh v.
Alabama,157 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,158 and Martin v. Struthers.159 True, he
lost some cases: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,160 Prince v.
Massachusetts,161 Jones v. City of Opelika,162 and Douglas v. Jeannette.163
But overall, he was on the winning side far more often than not. He won 85%
of the 44 cases that he argued before the High Court.164 What Covington
lacked in doctrinal nuance he ventured to make up with a certain down-toearth humanism that may well have moved certain members of the Court,
even if they had to do some jurisprudential spadework to help him prevail on
behalf of the persecuted clients he so vigorously defended. Perhaps this
picture of him is most apparent in his most famous case, one he won.

156

Witness’s Angle, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1943, at 68.

157

See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

158

See generally Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

159

See generally Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

See generally Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), discussed in JUDGING
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, supra note 115, at 203–29.
160
161

See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942) [hereinafter Jones v. Opelika I] (upholding
a licensing tax imposed against the Witnesses). Of course, the dissents in this case flagged a new
willingness of several of the Justices to move away from the holding in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Justices Murphy, Black, and Douglas joined Stone’s dissent in Jones , 316
U.S. at 600. More directly, they informed the reversal in the one paragraph per curiam ruling in Jones v.
City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) [hereinafter Jones v. Opelika II], the Justices vacated Jones v.
Opelika I on the basis of the reasons set forth in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
162

163

See generally Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).

JOHN R. VILE, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 134 (1st ed. 2001), noted in
John R. Vile, Hayden Covington, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1392/hayden-covington (last
visited Nov. 5, 2018). Thurgood Marshall’s success rate in the 36 of 42 cases he won in the Supreme
Court was slightly higher: 85.71%. Id.
164

2019]

Thoughts on Hayden C. Covington

629

The case: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,165 the
wartime flag-salute case. Recall, Barnette came to the Court against the
backdrop of an 8-1 ruling in the Gobitis case with only Justice Stone in
dissent.166 Then there was the appalling aftermath of the Gobitis ruling
against the Witnesses: Six days after the ruling came down,
a mob of 2,500 burned the Kingdom Hall in Kennebunkport,
Maine. On June 16, Litchfield, Illinois police jailed all of
that town’s sixty Witnesses, ostensibly protecting them from
their neighbors. [Shortly thereafter], townspeople in
Rawlins, Wyoming brutally beat five Witnesses; on June 22,
the people of Parco, Wyoming tarred and feathered another.
The American Civil Liberties Union reported to the Justice
Department that nearly 1,500 Witnesses were physically
attacked in more than 300 communities nationwide. One
Southern sheriff told a reporter why Witnesses were being
run out of town: “They’re traitors; the Supreme Court says
so. Ain’t you heard?”167
Hence, when Covington argued the case he had an 8-1 precedent against
him and a notable measure of ongoing public animus directed towards his
clients.168 Then again, he was the beneficiary of a newly constituted Court.169
Even so, Justice Robert Jackson, who would become the Witnesses’ hero in
165 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Covington’s role in the case is
discussed at some length in David R. Mainwaring’s book. See DAVID R. MAINWARING, RENDER UNTO
CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962).
166 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 601. And then there was the adverse ruling in Jones v. Opelika I, 316 U.S.
584 (1942).
167 Minersville Sch. District v. Gobitis, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 12, 2018, 12:48
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minersville_School_District_v._Gobitis (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).

PM),

168 Though some of the major newspapers were supportive of the Witnesses. See, e.g., Editorial,
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST, June 16, 1943, at 16; Lewis Wood, Rutledge Joins Supreme Court Civil
Liberty Cases are Reopened, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1943, at 1; Lewis Wood, Jehovah Sect Wins in High
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1943, at 6.
169 See Patrick J. Flynn, “Writing Their Faith into the Law of the Land:” Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Supreme Court’s Battle for the Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 1939-1945, 10 TEX. J.C.L. &
C.R. 1, 11–16 (2004); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 392–401 (2008). Other cases argued and won by Covington include: Jones v.
Opelika II, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam) (reversing state court judgments adverse to Petitioners);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (9-0 decision) (holding that Dallas ordinance violated free
exercise); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (8-0 decision) (holding that Paris, Texas ordinance
requiring permits in order to solicit orders for books was unconstitutional); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S.
583 (1943) (9-0 decision) (finding that criminal sanction cannot be imposed for communication that has
not been shown to have been done with an evil or sinister purpose); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944) (6-3 decision) (striking down local ordinance as violative of free exercise guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to Witnesses who distributed religious tracts and who
made their livelihood from such sales); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (5-4 decision) (striking
down sound amplification law as impermissible prior restraint).
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Barnette, was unsympathetic toward them only a month earlier when he
penned his concurrence in Douglas v. City of Jeannette170 (a 9-0 loss). There,
Jackson complained of the “singular persistence of the turmoil about
Jehovah’s Witnesses, one which seems to result from the work of no other
sect.”171 As he saw it, his colleagues should commence “a thorough
examination of their methods to see if they impinge unduly on the rights of
others.”172 To compound the problem for Covington’s clients, Jackson quoted
from Professor Chafee’s Freedom of Speech in the United States: “I cannot
help wondering whether the Justices of the Supreme Court are quite aware of
the effect of organized front-door intrusions upon people who are not
sheltered from zealots and impostors by a staff of servants or the locked
entrance of an apartment house.”173 From a lawyer’s perspective, such
declarations by a revered Justice were not good omens.
Then again, there were others who viewed the First Amendment matter
through a different lens, one sympathetic to the Witnesses. Notably, in a June
16, 1940 radio address, then Solicitor General Francis Biddle spoke openly
in defense of the Witnesses:
Jehovah’s Witnesses have been repeatedly set upon and
beaten. They had committed no crime; but the mob adjudged
they had, and meted out mob punishment. The Attorney
General has ordered an immediate investigation of these
outrages. The people must be alert and watchful, and above
all cool and sane. Since mob violence will make the
government’s task infinitely more difficult, it will not be
tolerated. We shall not defeat the Nazi evil by emulating its
methods.174
Not long thereafter, Biddle spoke publicly once more, this time before
the Pennsylvania Bar Association: “Self-constituted bands of mob
patrioteers,” he declared, “are roaming the country, setting upon these people,

170 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 166 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring). Even so,
Harold Ickes noted a discussion he had with Robert Jackson, before he was a Justice, who was said to be
“particularly bitter about the decision recently handed down by the Supreme Court in the Jehovah’s
Witnesses case . . . .” Vol. III, HAROLD L. ICKES, The Lowering Clouds 1939–1941, in THE SECRET DIARY
OF HAROLD L. ICKES 1, 211 (1954).
171

Douglas, 319 U.S. at 181.

Id. Contrast the statement in the text with what Jackson wrote in Barnette: “The freedom
asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual.”
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943).
172

173

Douglas, 319 U.S. at 182, n.3 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 154, at 407).

Jerry Bergman, The Modern Religious Objection to Mandatory Flag Salute in America: A
History and Evaluation, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 215, 232 (1997); Francis Biddle, Solicitor General,
Department of Justice, National Radio Address (June 16, 1940).
174
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beating them, driving them out of their homes.”175 Here by contrast, from a
lawyer’s perspective, such declarations from the Solicitor General were good
omens.
As for Mr. Covington and Barnette, he had the good fortune of having
an amicus brief filed in support of his clients by the Committee on the Bill of
Rights of the American Bar Association.176 One of the people on that
committee was none other than Professor Zechariah Chafee, the same man
who (like Justice Jackson) had been a critic of the Witnesses and their
proselyting. Covington’s merits brief echoed177 some of the important
arguments filed by the Committee in its amicus brief in Gobitis,178 which in
part declared:
The Committee has no interest in this litigation save as its
outcome (a) will affect the integrity of the basic right to
freedom of conscience, and (b) will bear upon the extent of
governmental power affirmatively to force our people to
express themselves in a particular manner. In this latter
aspect the case presents a constitutional question apparently
new to this Court, in that the question relates to the validity
of an affirmative command that the individual shall perform
a certain ritual. This is a new type of legislation, raising
questions different from the validity of a mere restraint or
prohibition against a particular form of expression, e.g.,
seditious or obscene utterances.179
Furthermore, the Committee argued that (i) a finding of fact regarding a
sincere religious belief cannot dismissed by some claim by the state to the
contrary,180 (ii) if the state is to prevail over such claims of conscience where
compulsion is involved, it must prove that “overriding . . . the individual’s
religious belief is essential in the public interest,”181 and (iii) “to compel the
salute over objection is an unconstitutional infringement upon individual

175

PETERS, supra note 115, at 10.

Brief for Comm. on the Bill of Rights of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591).
176

177 See Henderson, supra note 116, at 32 (citing DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR:
THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962)).
178 Brief for Comm. on the Bill of Rights of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Minersville Sch. Dist v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (No. 690).
179

Id. at 2–3.

180

Id. at 5.

181

Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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liberty, even though the refusal to comply is not deemed to involve a religious
question.”182 The latter argument proved dispositive in Barnette.
Then there was Covington’s oral argument in the case. Drawing on a
U.S. Law Week summary of those arguments from the time,183 Professor John
Q. Barrett identified the following nine arguments made by Covington:
1. The Barnett sisters were directly challenging the correctness of the
Court’s 1940 decision, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
upholding the constitutionality of compelling children who were
Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the American flag in their public
school.
2. There was no “more unstatesman-like decision” in the law than
Gobitis, “except possibly the Dred Scott decision.”
3. The effect of Gobitis had been “to restrain conscience and prohibit the
free exercise thereof.”
4. In Gobitis, the Supreme Court “shifted the burden of interpreting the
Constitution back to the school boards throughout the country” and
said, in effect, that their decisions would determine the rights of
Jehovah’s Witnesses.
5. Because “it is human to err and divine to forgive,” the Court should
reconsider Gobitis.
6. Gobitis advocated people fighting this issue out in the public forum.
The effect had been a “civil war against Jehovah’s Witnesses,”
including 48 states passing mandatory flag salute laws, expulsions of
more than 20,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses from public schools, and
other forms of persecution.
7. West Virginia admitted that Jehovah’s Witness school children
refusing to salute the flag while paying due respect to it in other ways
did not pose a clear and present danger to the community, so there
was no basis to deny the children’s exercise of their religious
convictions.
8. Three years of experience since Gobitis indicated that the only clear
and present danger resulting from a refusal to salute the flag was the
danger that the person so refusing would be mauled or killed.
9. Gobitis, “one of the greatest mistakes that this Court has ever
committed,” should be reversed.184

182 Id.; see also id. at 16 (explaining that the legislation at issue here “is of a sort new to America.
We have noted . . . its novelty as an attempt to compel a particular form of expression as distinguished
from restraints on certain kinds of expression.”).
183 JOHN
Q. BARRETT, ARGUING BARNETTE, ET AL. (1943) 1–2 (2013),
http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20130311-Jackson-List-Arguing-Barnette.pdf.
184

Id. at 2–3 (footnotes omitted).
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While such arguments may have won Covington some sympathy for his
clients, they were not the kind of arguments that carried much jurisprudential
weight.185 It is true: When it came to a panoramic knowledge of doctrinal
law, he was no Laurence Tribe or Kathleen Sullivan; when it came to nuance,
he was no Paul Clement or Neal Katya; and when it came to familiarity with
the history and jurisprudence of the First Amendment, he was no Floyd
Abrams or Robert Corn-Revere. Still, he was the lawyer who found and
prepared his clients; he was the one who tried the cases and then appealed
them; and he was the one who had the savvy to provide the right facts at the
right time to the right Court. None of the other luminaries brought that to the
table. In that sense, Hayden Covington could rightfully claim a place among
the great lawyers of the Supreme Court bar . . . and in the process gave new
and sustained meaning to the First Amendment.

The Lawyer & the Boxer: Beyond his fame as a First Amendment
lawyer, Hayden Covington also became one of the noted figures of the 1960s
counter-culture, sort of. It all had to do with a May 8, 1967 grand jury
indictment of man who refused induction into the military at the time of the
Vietnam War. That man was Cassius Clay, the infamous boxer who later
came to be known as Muhammad Ali.186
There is an Associated Press photo of a smiling Muhammad Ali flanked
by his attorney, Hayden Covington. The two talked with reporters after Ali
was arraigned in Houston.187 The boxer’s bond was set at $5,000. The smiles
between the two did not continue, however, as the first round of legal
proceedings did not favor the notorious champion. In part, that may well have

185 Gregory L. Peterson et al., Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 782 (2007). One of Justice Stone’s law clerk from the time, Bennett Boskey,
has observed: “Hayden Covington argued many cases in the Supreme Court. Many of them were won by
his side. There were those who said that his arguments had absolutely nothing to do with it, that it was
because of the views that the Justices had come to already and not the briefs or the arguments being made
by counsel that produced the result.” Id.
186 See generally WINSTON BOWMAN, UNITED STATES V. CLAY: MUHAMMAD ALI’S FIGHT
AGAINST
THE
VIETNAM
DRAFT
1
(2018),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/U.S._v._Clay_Muhammad_Ali%27s_Fight.pdf. The legal
side of the story is ably detailed in Winston Bowman’s United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight
Against the Vietnam Draft. Id. As recounted by Bowman, “Moments after receiving news that Ali had
formally refused to enter the military, the New York Athletic Commission, a powerful regulatory body in
the boxing world, suspended his boxing license. Other major licensing organizations soon followed suit,
making it virtually impossible for Ali to box in the United States.” Id.
187 See Ed Kolenovsky, Covington Ali, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (June 4, 2016),
https://www.fredericksburg.com/covington-ali/image_15dba72e-2a0e-11e6-ae2d-53bdd6f071e2.html.
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been owing to the way Covington handled the case. In that regard, legal
historian Winston Bowman has noted:
At trial, Covington opted not to emphasize the potential
weaknesses in the DOJ’s legal recommendations, primarily
relying on other defenses, including arguments that Ali
should be classified as a religious minister and that the draft
process itself was unfair. Covington likely should have
known that the Department’s recommendations offered a
real opportunity to attack Ali’s classification, however.
Several years earlier, he had successfully argued an
analogous case, Sicurella v. United States (1955),188 in
which the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a
conscientious objector because of a flawed DOJ
recommendation. Importantly, in Sicurella, the Court
established a rule to the effect that erroneous advice on any
element of a conscientious objector claim required reversal
of a draft evasion conviction, even if a board might have
decided the case on other, valid grounds. The premise of this
rule was that because the boards did not produce written
opinions stating the rationale for their decisions, it was
impossible to tell whether an objector’s claim had been
denied on proper or improper grounds.189
The trial in United States v. Clay lasted two days. Covington asked few
questions of the government’s three witness. His defense was as simple,
apparently too simple: the government, he maintained, was processing
classification claims at such a furious pace that it could not have possibly
given due consideration to his client’s claims. Moreover, the draft board
clerks based their biased decision on press stories about Ali—hardly credible.
To that end, Covington called two of the clerks of the local draft boards. That
tactic had only partial success owing to the judge’s rulings limiting the scope
of such questioning. To compound the problem, Covington called a member
of the draft board of appeals to the witness stand; it proved embarrassing: the
man “was not one of the board members who had deliberated on Ali’s draft
status.”190 And when he had the opportunity to contest the DOJ’s assessment
of Ali’s religious beliefs, he made other arguments, again not compelling
ones. The result: after a mere twenty minutes, the jury returned a guilty

188 Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 385–86 (1955) (discussing how Covington argued the
cause and filed a brief for the petitioner).
189

BOWMAN, supra note 186, at 14.

190

Id. at 15.
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verdict. The sentence: five years in a federal prison and a $10,000 fine.191 It
was the maximum.
Of course, the conviction was appealed. When it went up before the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Hayden Covington’s services were no
longer sought. Sometime afterwards,192 the famed counsel sued the famed
boxer to the tune of $250,000 in attorney’s fees, purportedly for unpaid
services.193
After the matter was argued194 before the high Court, the vote originally
appeared to be 5-3 (with Justice Marshall not participating) to uphold Ali’s
conviction.195 But in the end, it all played out in Ali’s favor196: 8-0 to reverse
by way of a per curiam opinion with Justices Harlan and Douglas writing
separate concurring opinions. It all ended quite well for Hayden Covington’s
client,197 despite his trial court strategies. Not surprisingly, missing from the
press photos of the time was one with the famous boxer and his once famous
lawyer.

I think he was a crusader. He was a fighter. He needed
a cause to fight for, and this was a cause he found.198
Winning for him was losing because when he won
his purpose in life was gone. 199
– Jerry Bergman

He won many cases, but by 1978 his glory days were past. All that were
left were memories of many cases won and some lost, but even those were
“righteous” losses. His time and come and passed. He was a man no longer

191

Id. at 16.

Id. “Having been rebuffed by the Fifth Circuit, Ali appealed to the Supreme Court, which
remanded the case to Judge Ingraham’s court for procedural reasons.” Id. at 18.
192
193

Id. at 16.

Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 698 (1971) (discussing how Chauncey Eskridge argued
the cause for Petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Jonathan
Shapiro, and Elizabeth B. DuBois. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson and Beatrice Rosenberg.).
194

195

See Bowman, supra note 186, at 20.

196

See Clay, 403 U.S. at 705, 710.

BOWMAN, supra note 186, at 22. “In 2005, President George W. Bush awarded Ali the
Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor.” Id.
197

198 Henderson, supra note 116, at 67 (citing Interview with Jerry Bergman in Montpelier, Ohio
(May 18, 2002)).
199

Bergman, supra note 142.
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kept alive by a cause, by a fight,200 by that chance to charge into a battle
against all odds—he was a war-torn soldier with no more wars to fight. And
then there was money: it was always a struggle making ends meet, especially
when he went out on his own.201 At a time when men were seen as the sole
breadwinners, his wife Dorothy202 “took care of the family and worked full
time (in the pressroom of a Cincinnati newspaper for over 20 years).”203
Worse still, then as now, he was a virtual unknown in the legal profession, in
the constitutional world, and in the First Amendment community. In that
sense, he was dead even before he died.
In an interview two days before he died, Covington (age 67) looked back
on law and life, albeit with his mind on the Lord: “you have got to recognize
the power that’s against us,” he said, and then added, “without the power that
Jehovah’s got helping us out, we’re dead ducks.”204 It had been a long battle,
first fighting for the Church, and then against the demon drink,205 and even
against the Witnesses’ president whom he tagged a “cobra”—”‘Do you know
what a cobra does? They’ll slither behind you, and they’ll strike
viciously.’”206 Predictably, this great champion of the Witnesses was

200

Id.

Covington had no qualms about fighting physically. He said, “If someone looks at me the wrong
way I’ll beat the s— out of him.” He was a fighter, and that is one reason why he did so well in
court. Covington freely used profanity, which could have been due to his Texas upbringing (his
father was a Texas Ranger). This surprised me: Witnesses usually don’t swear. He was good with
words, was very aggressive in court, and loved a good fight. Part of his downfall was, as the Society
won more and more cases, there was less and less need to fight.
Id.
201 Id. Said his wife, Dorothy: “He would get a job at a law firm and handle a case or two, but
would soon be let go.” Id. “After Covington was disfellowshiped [see text infra accompanying note 207]
from the Witnesses in 1963, he almost wholly abandoned his legal career. While he worked from time to
time on cases for various law firms, he was unable to hold down a position for more than a few months.”
Henderson, supra note 116, at 79.
202 Dorothy Covington, Wife of Civil Liberties Attorney Hayden Covington, Dies at 92, JW.ORG
(Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.jw.org/en/news/legal/by-region/united-states/dorothy-covington-dies/.
203

Bergman, supra note 143.

204

Id.; Covington Interview, supra note 128.

205

Henderson, supra note 116, at 79 (footnotes omitted).

In 1963, twenty-four years after Hayden Covington accepted the job at the Watchtower Bible and
Tract Society, he was disfellowshipped from the organization. The official reason behind
Covington’s removal from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society was alcohol abuse. Colin
Quackenbush described Covington’s weakness for alcohol as falling ‘into the trap of drinking too
much.’ M. James’ Penton, in Apocalypse Delayed suggested that Covington’s drinking problem was
a symptom of ‘overwork and tension’ from almost twenty-five years of service in the legal
department.
Id.
206

Bergman, supra note 142.
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disfellowshipped, meaning he was excommunicated. Shortly before his
death, however, he was reinstated.207
If you venture to Covina Hills, California, you’ll find Mr. Covington
resting at plot 3, block 5727 of the Forest Lawn Memorial Park Cemetery.
His headstone reads:
HAYDEN C. COVINGTON
Beloved Husband and Father
Jan. 19, 1911–Nov. 21, 1978208
Those words seem ironic for two reasons: first, apparently, he was not
the best of husbands and fathers,209 and second, no lasting words were cast
for his greatest life achievement—that of a lawyer who argued and won more
First Amendment cases in the Supreme Court than all others. His tombstone
was thus lacking; it needed to be reversed if only to give Hayden Covington
the credit he deserves. The past, after all, lives only in the memories of the
living.

207 VILE, supra note 164, at 139; Henderson, supra note 116, at 82 (footnote omitted) (“Covington
was formally reinstated to the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society just prior to his death in 1978. He was
a dedicated Witness upon his return to the Society, choosing fieldwork as a new mission. Colin
Quackenbush reported that the Sunday prior to Covington’s death, he was ‘out in the field for seven
hours.’”).
208

Richard Pittman, image post to Hayden Cooper Covington, FIND A GRAVE (Sept. 3, 2015),

https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/61896595/hayden-cooper-covington.
209

See Bergman, supra note 142.

Covington’s fall from grace was not just a personal struggle. His family was directly influenced by
both his lack of work and his alcoholism. For example, Covington’s wife left a full-time position
raising her children for a full-time position in the pressroom of a Cincinnati newspaper. [Jerry]
Bergman, who spoke with Covington’s wife during his interview, said she resented the fact he could
not or would not support his own family . . . These problems ultimately lead, in the mid-1970s, to a
separation between Covington and his wife. Although he was drinking more than working,
Covington made the decision to leave his wife and her continued connection to the Witnesses. While
they never officially divorced, their separation marked the end of a long, painful period in the
Covington family history. In the late 1970s, Hayden Covington “hit rock bottom.” His alcohol abuse
had led to liver disease so severe his doctors said that if he did not stop drinking he would die.
Henderson, supra note 116, at 81 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Robert H. Jackson Center, Lynn Covington
Elfers
(2018)
on
Hayden
Covington,
17:33,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
19,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pgv8LmfhmpI (“I’m proud to be genetically connected to someone
that had such an [impact] on American jurisprudence. Really. It’s, of course, something that any daughter
would really be proud of.”).

